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Abstract 
 
Engineered Resilient Systems (ERS) is a Department of Defense (DoD) program focusing on the 
effective and efficient design and development of resilient complex engineered systems throughout 
their lifecycle.  There is growing literature with qualitative definitions of resilience and 
quantitative models for systems, but these focus typically on systems with one performance 
measure.  In application, many systems have multiple functions and multiple performance 
measures. This research uses a quantitative resilience framework for ERS that includes system 
design options, reliability, external threats, vulnerabilities, responses, and consequences assessed 
on multiple system performance measures. This paper applies the ERS framework to designing 
resilient networks.  
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4 
 
1. Introduction 
Andrew Zolli wrote in his 2012 book Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back; “Resilient systems 
fail gracefully. A perfect system is often most fragile” [Zolli]. In the current climate of system 
design, systems are continually designed to be more lean and efficient, however this can lead to 
direct tradeoffs with the ability of a system to cope with unexpected threats and environments. In 
operational use, many systems are subject to outside forces and influence in ways or at levels 
which are often unaccounted for during the design of the system. These outside forces and 
influences can cause the system to fail ungracefully in spectacular and challenging ways. The 
immediate aftermath of any system failure raises questions concerning the ability of the system 
tasks to be completed, how to recover the system, and the performance of the system moving 
forward. These questions are impossible to predict but the inclusion of resilient features in the 
design stage has the potential to provide solutions for how to handle the situation. One example 
from recent history of this scenario is the Fukashima Diiachi level 7 International Nuclear Event 
where, despite the high reliability of the nuclear power plant’s system to perform safely despite a 
multitude of possible internal and external disruptions, the system failed due to an unexpected 
event. The unexpected event was the test of the system’s resilience. The ability for the workers 
and government to handle the unforeseen situation was dependent on decisions made in the design 
stage. 
 
Resilience is a current issue in many sectors of industry and government. The Department of 
Defense has sponsored a program titled “Engineered Resilient Systems” which focuses on the 
effective and efficient design and development of resilient complex engineered systems throughout 
the system’s lifecycle. This paper will summarize the literature behind resilient systems. This paper 
will also discuss and describe ERS and its components. Next this paper will analyze a network 
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through a decision tree matrix of ERS in an attempt to optimize the design tradeoff space of 
resilience versus cost. Finally, this paper will draw conclusions about the ERS framework applied 
to networks and provide additional areas of research and improvement for the ERS framework. 
2. Literature Review 
Resilience was originally defined in ecology to describe the persistence of nature [1]. From these 
ecological origins, two parallel definitions of resilience arose. The first is from Holling in 1973 
which defines resilience as “the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of 
the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, 
and still persist.” Hollings definition emphasizes conditions far from stable steady-state, where 
instabilities can flip a system into different behavior but the system continues to exist. In this case, 
resilience is measured by the magnitude of changes that can be absorbed before the system moves 
to extinction in one or more of its state variables [2]. The second definition, due to Pimm in 1991, 
defines resilience as the length of time a system disturbed by outside forces takes to return to 
equilibrium. This definition of resilience could be measured by a return time for each of the 
system’s state variables [3]. This definition is expanded upon and illustrated by the work of Barker 
et al in 2013 which can be seen in Figure 1. In the simplest form of Pimm’s calculation of 
resilience, resilience is measure by the time between te and tf. For the same event, the shorter the 
time between the event and recovery by single performance measure the more resilient the system 
is [3]. 
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Figure 1: State transitions over time with respect to system performance [4] 
 
These alternative meanings of resilience reflect different viewpoints about function of resilience 
and are often applied uniquely across separate domains. Pimm’s resilience examines system 
behavior of one known stable state and focuses on maintaining efficiency of function. On the other 
hand, Holling’s resilience examines alternative stable states and focuses on maintaining existence 
of function. The differences in viewpoints contribute to the difficulty of current literature in 
providing a unified and quantified definition of resilience and in general there is a lack of standard 
definition in the literature. 
From a systems perspective, such as the domain of Engineered Resilient Systems, Neches and 
Madni in 2012 define a resilient system as “the ability of the system to adapt affordably and 
perform effectively across a wide range of operational contexts” [5]. Goerger in his 2014 paper 
cites this concept from Neches and Madni as “Broad Utility” and adds to the definition 
characteristics a system must have from a DoD perspective which includes, “ability to 
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Repel/Resist/Absorb; ability to Recover; and ability to Adapt.” Goerger concludes his paper with 
the definition of resilience for the DoD as “A resilient system is trusted and effective out of the 
box, can be used in a wide range of contexts, is easily adapted to many others through 
reconfiguration and/or replacement, and has a graceful and detectable degradation of function” 
[6]. These definitions offer three useful perspectives. 
As can be seen from this brief literature review, the field of resilience lacks a unified definition. In 
addition, the various definitions of resilience are lacking in several critical aspects. In the case of 
Holling’s work multiple variables are considered insofar as they continue to exists and not as a 
measurement of performance or value. In Pimm’s work as illustrated by Barker, only one variable 
is used as the performance measure and the only evaluation criteria is time while again value and 
performance is ignored. Finally in Goerger’s paper there is yet to be a quantifiable definition of 
resilience. In most definitions, there is a lack of cost associated with resilience. Much of the 
remaining research which proposes quantified definitions, are based on a single variable which is 
most commonly time and rarely cost. Thus, there is a clear gap for a quantification method of 
resilience using multivariate performance models. This paper will discuss ERS, a system 
framework that allows for the use of multiple performance measures to ascertain the value of a 
system after a disturbance to function. This paper will discuss an example of ERS applied to 
evaluating and designing a real-world resilient network. 
3. ERS Description 
This paper was written in conjunction with Small et al. [7] to establish the foundation of the ERS 
framework and explore the literature gap in key interest fields. As such, Small identifies the 
framework of ERS as a cost-based multivariate probabilistic decision tree with the option to 
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modify for an intelligent threat (attacker) or the threat from natural hazard [7]. The generic decision 
tree and influence diagram for this framework can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Influence diagram for the ERS framework [7] 
The key terms for the ERS model are: 
 Scenario: set of conditions of use for a given system. 
 Missions: set of objectives of a system. A system may be designed to satisfy multiple 
missions or a single mission. In an intelligent attacker system an attack may attempt to 
cause failure to one or more of these missions. 
 Design decision: options available for the system in the design stage. The decisions may 
be unique for different scenarios and missions. 
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 Produceability: the ability of the system to be produced or implemented given the 
associated costs or barriers. 
 Supportability: the costs of maintenance and supply associated with the produced system. 
 Reliability: the probability the system fails before the outside disturbance. Reliability may 
be dependent on the design decisions. 
 Threat: the probability of an outside disruptive event acting on the system. In an intelligent 
attacker scenario this may be influenced by the mission and scenario in which the system 
operates. 
 Survivability: the probability of the system to be functional or at a state which can be 
returned to previous performance levels. 
 Resilience Response: the actions which are taken by the system or outside actors to return 
the system to previous performance levels for the original mission given the design options 
chosen.  
 Flexibility Response: the actions which are taken by the system or outside actors to redefine 
the system to perform a new mission. 
 Availability: the likelihood a system is able to perform its mission at a given time. 
 Performance: how the system performs following a disturbance. This depends on the 
reliability, the survivability, and the response. 
 Service life: the length of time the system can serve to fulfil its mission. 
 Value: the return to scale across all performance measures, calculated with a value model. 
 Life Cycle Cost: the monetary value of all costs throughout the service life of the system 
including the cost of design options to increase resilience. 
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 Affordability: the ability of the system to justify by value the life cycle cost for the options 
to be attractive. 
The ERS modeling framework is an approach to resilience which directly compares alternatives 
in terms of value and cost in a way which is not being done currently. It incorporates elements of 
Holling’s definition in its ability to survive. ERS encompasses Pimm’s and Barker’s definition of 
resilience in its measurement of recovery and goes a step further to relate it to value. ERS expands 
upon the idea of affordability discussed in the work of Neches and Madni. Finally, ERS explores 
the idea of “Broad Utility” with its relation to value as a system can change the direction of its 
performance vectors and still provide significant value. ERS is also unique in its ability to estimate 
the value of multiple decision interactions as alternatives could be compared individually or as 
separate configurations and each will return the same value versus cost perspective. 
4. Network Case Study 
4.1 Case Study Identification and Initialization 
To apply the ERS framework to a network problem, several criteria for the case study network 
were determined. These criteria are; the case network must suffer from an external threat, must 
allow for design or redesign of the network or its systems in ways which could increase its 
resilience in respect to the definition of resilience, and must have at least one objective, 
quantifiable measure of performance. A network which fit these base criteria would be able to be 
optimized in a cost versus resilience design tradespace through the use of the ERS framework. 
The identified criteria led to an examination of rail networks in Missouri. The Missouri rail 
networks match the criteria listed for an application of the ERS framework in the external threats 
the rail lines suffer such as weather, opportunities to design or redesign with increased resilience 
to these external threats such as weather hardening, and an objective, quantifiable performance 
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measure in the amount of goods able to be successfully distributed by the rail network. The 
following rail network, Figure 4, from The Association of American Railroads provides the basis 
for the network in this case study. 
 
Figure 4: Missouri Rail Line Network [AAR] 
While preserving all identified nodes identified in the Missouri rail line network model, a 
simplified network was determined the case study as seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Simplified Rail Network Model 
The model characterizes major rail lines connecting 9 listed nodes as a set of 10 edges where 
connections currently exist. In the case study, transportation of goods will occur along these 
lines. 
For evaluation purposes, a type of good was needed to be measured in transfer between nodes. 
Again, the basis for the test data was drawn from the Association of American Railroads 2012 
data which quantifies the amount of food products beginning in Missouri and leaving the state at 
3,157,000 tons for the 2012 year [AAR]. This data led to a refined final version of the current 
network which can be seen in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Current Network for Food Production and Transportation in Missouri 
In this current network there are two demand nodes, St. Louis and Kansas City, and 4 input 
nodes; Bucklin, Jefferson City, Carthage, and Poplar Bluff. Links 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10 are 
classified as arcs as they end at one of the two demand nodes and links 4, 5, and 9 remain 
classified as edges. Total demand for this network is estimated at 3,150,000 tons per year or 
8,569 tons per day between the two demand nodes. Max potential input for this network was 
notionally estimated at 5,000,000 tons per year or 13,699 tons per day allocated between the 4 
input nodes. All edges and arcs were assumed to have sufficiently large capacity but each have 
varying cost of use per ton of food. It should be noted this data is notional for the purposes of 
this case study. Summary charts of this network initialization information can be found in Table 
1 and Table 2. 
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Table 1: Node Input and Demand Summary Data 
 
Table 2: Arc/Edge Cost Summary Data 
This data represents the initial parameters of the case study used for the evaluation of the ERS 
framework and remain constant throughout the evaluation. 
4.2 Case Study Conditions and Methodology 
Due to the limited scope of the case study, after analysis, only the following non-shaded nodes of 
the ERS influence diagram will be evaluated which can be seen in Figure 7. 
Node
Bucklin 2,740 0
Jefferson City 4,110 0
Carthage 3,014 0
Springfield 0 0
Monroe City 0 0
Cape Giradeau 0 0
Poplar Bluff 3,836 0
Kansas City 0 3,090
St. Louis 0 5479
Totals: 13,699 8,569
Input 
(Tons/Day)
Demand 
(Tons/Day)
Arc/Edge Cost ($/Ton)
1 34.25
2 43.01
3 38.63
4 15.62
5 17.81
6 36.16
7 58.90
8 35.07
9 22.47
10 32.33
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Figure 7: ERS Influence Diagram for Rail Line Case Study 
The case study examined uses an unintelligent attacker model meaning the scenario and mission 
have no influence on the threat. This case study does not look at the supportability factor as a 
constraint was made which states all designs must be equally supportable. This constraint was 
added because the empirical data existed for a system already in place so any alternatives which 
could not be supported by the current system would not be acceptable. The assumption made for 
availability assumes that the rail lines are available if they have not failed. Finally, it was 
assumed the responses of the system would be focused solely on returning the functionality of 
the network to its original mission and flexible responses will not be considered. Values and 
scenarios used in this ERS case study are notional and based on empirical examples of threats to 
rail lines and actions taken to address these threats before or after a failure, unless specifically 
noted otherwise. The means of this testing was through the adapting of the ERS influence 
diagram and the case study constraints and assumptions into a decision tree. This adaptation can 
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be seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Modified ERS Decision Tree 
This decision tree could then be expanded and solved, theoretically resulting in optimization of 
the design tradespace of the case study. Through the use of this technique, the performance of the 
ERS framework will be evaluated. 
4.2.1 Identification of Case Study Threats 
 
The method for evaluating ERS began with the identification of threats. It should be noted threat 
is not the starting node in the influence diagram however it is an independent node free from 
influence in an unintelligent attacker scenario. Threats identified directly influence the 
survivability of the network and the network’s ability to respond. By identifying the threat 
potential first in an unintelligent attacker scenario design options can then be proposed which 
would directly mitigate the impact of the actualized threat. The first threat identified includes the 
loss of an edge or arc due to flooding, vandalism, or severe storm. The probability of the first 
threat to each edge and arc is 0.005 and is independent of any other failures. The duration of both 
threat one affecting arcs/edges and threat two affecting nodes was set at a constant 20 days given 
a normal response. The cost of a normal response action is $20,000 per day of failure. A 
simplification assumption was made which assumes no two edges or arcs may fail in the same 
year. Though a two edge or arc failing would be expected about once every 50,000 years, the 
additional complexity in the model and the corresponding multitude of decision tree branches for 
such a small probability would have had insignificant impact on the solving of the decision tree. 
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4.2.2 Identification of Case Study Options 
 
The second step in the case study involved the identification of design options. With threats 
identified, the overarching purpose of the identified options focused on the mitigation in duration 
or likelihood of the threat, or the development of alternative paths for the network. The first 
design option identified is the hardening of edges and arcs against the previously identified 
threats. This first option may harden each arc or edge on an individual basis and there is no 
minimum to the amount of links which must be hardened if one link is hardened. The hardening 
of an edge reduces the probability of a failure from the unintelligent attacker by ten from 0.005 
to 0.0005. An example of this hardening may be the addition of additional barricades along a rail 
line. This hardening is a one-time cost of $20,000. The second identified design option is the 
addition of emergency response teams. These teams reduce the duration of the effect of an 
actualized threat and allows for a rapid response which reduces the duration of effect by half of 
the normal 20 days. This emergency response team has a yearly cost of $2,000 but is unique in 
its ability to respond to any failure meaning the duration of actualized threat on any line is 
reduced by the one emergency response team. The cost of the emergency response team response 
is reduced to $12,000 per day of failure. The final identified design option is the addition of a 
new production node, Clinton, and the corresponding construction of an additional arc starting 
from Clinton and ending in Kansas City. The construction of this node and arc cost $1,074,126. 
Clinton has the notional capability to produce 1,370 tons of food per day. The arc has an 
associated use cost of $20.82/ton. As a final note in this evaluation only one design option may 
be selected. Though multiple selections could theoretically be evaluated using ERS, this 
overview is limiting one option selection for simplicity. In an application scenario the choosing 
of only one option could be required because of budget, labor, or other resource constraints. This 
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also renders the influence node of produceability irrelevant as this assumption forces all options 
to be equally produceable. 
4.2.3 Identification of Case Study Reliability and Survivability 
 
The next step is to determine are the reliability of the network system and the survivability of the 
system given an assumed threat. For use in this deterministic case study, the network is assigned 
to be perfectly reliable or have reliability of one. In this case study, none of the options affect the 
reliability of the network therefore the reliability factor is constant for all branches of the 
decision tree. Conversely the network is assigned to totally fail under an actualized threat and 
survivability is zero in that no amount of food can be transported along that link. A survivability 
factor of zero or total failure was assumed as the most realistic as when track damage occurs 
trains cease all operations along the track. 
4.2.4 Identification of Case Study Responses 
 
The response of the system is the action taken after a failure has occurred. If a failure does not 
occur no response is taken. Because a failure can only occur due to an assumed threat of 
survivability zero, a response occurs to repair the failure. As described previously, the failure 
response of the system has a base duration of 20 days. It is assumed during the 20 days the 
functionality of the node or arc is zero and at the conclusion of the 20th day is back to full 
operation. If the emergency response team has been chosen as described in the case study 
options, then it is assumed the functionality of the node or arc is zero for the duration of 10 days 
and after 10 days is fully operational. If a response is required, the cost per day of the response 
action is notionally set at $5000. This is true for both a normal or emergency response as the 
addition cost of an emergency response is built into its yearly cost listed in the case study 
options. 
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4.2.5 Identification of Case Study Performance and Value Measures 
 
The final step in the method for evaluating the case study involves identifying the performance 
and value measures needed to draw conclusions about the solution. The performance of the 
network will be measured by the ability of the network to satisfy the demand at both of the 
demand nodes. Any failure to meet this demand would result in fractional performance. The 
value of the network is measured by the total cost to use and maintain the network. 
4.2.6 Case Study Decision Tree 
The notional constructs which have been described serve to create the conditions for the case 
study. The conditions serve to provide the calculations and branches of the decision tree which is 
the basis for this case study evaluation. The case study generic decision tree can be summarily 
seen in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Case Study Decision Tree 
4.2.7 Case Study Modeling 
 
To solve this decision tree, a two-step Excel network model was built to be solved as a linear 
program using Microsoft Excel’s Solver add-in. A two-stage model was selected as no input 
node was further away than two arcs from an output node and, as shown in Figure 6, there is no 
possible path for a good to travel a third consecutive time. The design of the two-stage model 
was such that each scenario of failure given the discussed options could be created and solved for 
No Act
Options
Flood … …
Flood
No 
Action
Fortify 
Arc
Rapid 
Resp.
Clinton 
Node
Flood
Flood
No Fail
Fail N1
Fail Nn
1-P(F)
.005
.005
Norm 
Act
Norm 
Act
No Fail
Fail N1
Fail Nn
1-P(F)
.0005
.0005
No Fail
Fail N1
Fail Nn
1-P(F)
.005
.005
No Fail
Fail N1
Fail Nn
1-P(F)
.005
.005
No Act
No Act
… …
Norm 
Act
Norm 
Act
No Act
No Act
… …
Rapid 
Act
Rapid 
Act
No Act
No Act
… …
Norm 
Act
Norm 
Act
No Act
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the cost associated with each branch of the decision tree. Figure 10 and Figure 11 are a high 
level image of the two-hop network model built in Excel. Yellow shaded cells represent input 
parameters, shaded blue cells are the changeable variables of the model, and shaded green cells 
are calculations. The total cost was represented by the addition of Stage 1 and Stage 2 Costs.  
 
Figure 10: Excel Network Model Step 1 
 
Figure 11: Excel Network Model Step 2 
From Kansas City Bucklin Jefferson City Carthage Monroe City Springfield St. Louis Cape Giradeau Poplar Bluff
Bucklin 34.25 NA NA NA 17.81 NA NA NA NA
Jefferson City 43.01 NA NA NA NA NA 36.16 NA NA
Carthage 38.63 NA NA NA NA 15.62 NA NA NA
Springfield NA NA NA 15.62 NA NA 58.90 NA NA
Monroe City NA 17.81 NA NA NA NA 35.07 NA NA
Cape Giradeau NA NA NA NA NA NA 32.33 NA 22.47
Poplar Bluff NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 22.47 NA
From Kansas City Bucklin Jefferson City Carthage Monroe City Springfield St. Louis Cape Giradeau Poplar Bluff Shipped From Production
Bucklin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,740
Jefferson City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,110
Carthage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,014
Springfield 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monroe City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cape Giradeau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poplar Bluff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,836
Shipped To 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,699
Required 3,090 0 0 0 0 0 5479 0 0 8,569
Stage 1 Costs $0.00
To
From Kansas City Bucklin Jefferson CityCarthage Monroe CitySpringfieldSt. Louis Cape GiradeauPoplar Bluff
Bucklin 34.25 NA NA NA 17.81 NA NA NA NA
Jefferson City 43.01 NA NA NA NA NA 36.16 NA NA
Carthage 38.63 NA NA NA NA 15.62 NA NA NA
Springfield NA NA NA 15.62 NA NA 58.90 NA NA
Monroe City NA 17.81 NA NA NA NA 35.07 NA NA
Cape Giradeau NA NA NA NA NA NA 32.33 NA 22.47
Poplar Bluff NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 22.47 NA
From Kansas City Bucklin Jefferson CityCarthage Monroe CitySpringfieldSt. Louis Cape GiradeauPoplar Bluff Shipped FromProduction
Bucklin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jefferson City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carthage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Springfield 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monroe City 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cape Giradeau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poplar Bluff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shipped To 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Required 3,090 0 0 0 0 0 5479 0 0 8569
Stage 2 Costs -$             
To
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The mathematical model basis for what was entered into Excel Solver consisted of three sets: set 
N consisting of all nodes number {1,…,n} where i, j ϵ N, set A consisting of all possible directed 
arcs where (i, j) ϵ A, set bi which consists of the set of constant supply or demand of each node 
where if bi > 0 the node is a supply node, if bi < 0 the node is a demand node, and if if bi = 0 the 
node is a transshipment node, finally set cij which consists of the set of constant costs associated 
with the shipment of goods along each arc. The full list of members for each of these sets can be 
viewed in the appendix. The objective of this model was to minimize the cost of the shipment of 
food which can be seen in Equation 1. 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒: ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴
 
Equation 1: Linear Program Objective Function 
 
Where the variable xij represents the amount of flow which is shipped along arc (i, j). This 
objective function is subject to the following constraints, seen in Equation 2, and Equation 3. 
 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑗=(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴
− ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑗=(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐴
≤ 𝑏𝑖    ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
Equation 2: Conservation of Flow Along Arcs 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 > 0;   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟 
Equation 3: Constraints on Variable x 
The second equation states the flow from one node to a second node must be conserved. By this, 
in a transshipment node, xij must equal xji as the demand and supply at this node is 0 so the flow 
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in must equal the flow out. For bi > 0 the flow out, xij, must be greater than the flow in. For bi < 0 
the flow in, xji, must be greater than the flow out to satisfy demand. The constraint in the second 
equation allows for the possibility that demand is over satisfied (e.g. receives -12 units when bi is 
-10 units) however this circumstance will not happen in this model as the objective is to 
minimize cost and the flow of additional units would unnecessarily increase costs. The third 
equation constrains the variable x to be a positive integer. The mathematical model was 
converted into equations for the Solver tool which can be seen in the appendix. To quickly solve 
for each possible branch identified in the decision tree a Visual Basic macro was written to loop 
the Solver program with each arcs failed. It should be noted to simulate failure the cost of using 
the arc was made arbitrarily expensive at $1,000,000 per ton to force the cost minimization 
model to use another arc if such a solution could exist. The code for this Visual Basic macro can 
also be found in the appendix. In addition, for additional analysis a payback period analysis will 
be performed where applicable in accordance with Equation 4. 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
Equation 4: Payback Period Equation 
4.3 Case Study Results 
The macro consisting of the Solver network model was run first with the unmodified two-step 
model and a second time with the new Clinton node added. The results of each of these solutions 
were output into a table which can be seen in the appendix. The case study decision tree was 
expanded to show the value of each branch in terms of total cost per day averaged over a 1-year 
time interval. The expanded decision tree for the No Action option in Figure 12. The expanded 
decision tree branches for the other three options can be seen in the appendix. 
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No Act
Flood
No Fail
Fail N1
Fail 
N2,3,6,7,8
.995
.005
Norm 
Act
Norm 
Act
No Act
No Act
Norm 
Act
No Act
Norm 
Act
No Act
Norm 
Act
 $ 331,034.77 
Fail N4
Fail N5
.005
Fail 
N9,5
.005
.005
.005
 $ 342,024.66 
$ 333,006.82 
 $ 331,034.77 
 $ 332,404.63 
 $ 411,650.27 
 $ 336,821.92 
 $ 339,093.28 
 $ 332,846.19 
 $ 334,412.51 
 $ 332,589.71 
No 
Action
 
Figure12: No action option and associated branch costs 
For each option, the network could be solved despite any single arc failure. In addition, the 
failure of arc 4 (Jef-KC) was the costliest. Given only one node could fail in a given year, each 
option value was calculated using a worst-case failure scenario of the arc 4 failure to assess 
which option would be the most resilient and least costly in this scenario. The summary 
calculations of the four options can be seen in Figure 13. 
Flood  $  331,063.71 No 
Action
            
Flood  $  331,092.45 Fortify 
Arc
 
Flood  $  333,047.18 Rapid 
Resp.
                    
Clinton 
Node
Flood  $  312,118.45 
 
Figure 13: Decision Tree Option Calculations 
4.4 Case Study Results Analysis 
Based on the calculations of the decision tree, in this case study the addition of the Clinton node 
would be the option to be selected as it is significantly less expensive on a per day per year cost 
than all other alternatives. The decision tree has also provided the ability to rank alternatives by 
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cost so that after the Clinton addition the next preferred option is No Action followed by Fortify 
Arc and Rapid Response. A closer examination reveals the reason the Clinton node is preferred 
is it reduces non-failure operating cost by over $20,000 dollars per day before accounting for 
purchase costs and $19,000 after accounting daily for the $1,000,000. The addition of the Clinton 
node increases the agility of the network and diversifies to protect from the impact of high-value 
arcs such as arc 4. 
All other resilience options performed worse than the course of taking no action. The ERS 
decision tree reveals the cause of this to be the low probability of failure versus the impact. For 
the non-Clinton options the failure of arc 4 cost an additional $5,787 per day for the year but at a 
probability of failure at 0.005 the expected cost per day per year is $29.94 per day per year. This 
$29.94 per day per year is the breakeven point for any resilience alternative cost of normal 
operation per day. None of the non-Clinton alternatives was equal to or less than this value. 
Clinton, through significant investment, had an expected cost of $-18,945 per day per year and 
was thus the clearly preferred alternative.  
Finally, payback period analysis was performed for all options. No Action used no investment 
and thus no relevant payback analysis. The Fortify Arc and Rapid Response option did not save 
any money for the investment made and thus hold an infinite payback period. Finally, the 
Clinton node’s payback period can be calculated using Equation 4 to show Payback Period = 
$1,075,126 / $6,915,019 which is approximately 0.16 years. 
4.5 Case Study Conclusion 
The ERS framework in a modified decision tree worked well in identifying the most attractive 
resilience option. In addition, the ERS framework encouraged well-rounded planning and 
consideration in the design phase in requiring the examination of influences on the network. The 
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ERS framework in the case study fit well with the definition of resilience as it examines the 
effect of outside forces and provides quantifiable context for each of the resilient options in 
terms of cost. In this case study, ERS identified an alternative which may not have been intuitive. 
The Clinton node required a significant amount of investment and without this analysis 
conducted the fear of the Clinton arc failure or overestimation of the time to fix may have driven 
the design team to a non-optimal conclusion. In this case study, ERS presented an encompassing 
picture of the costs of the problem and allowed for a clear recommendation to be made based on 
life cycle costs. 
5. Conclusion 
The ERS framework strives to fill the gap in current resilience literature. Current resilience 
literature ignores multivariate objectives, may confuse resilience with reliability, focuses solely on 
survivability, or fails to consider cost when evaluating decisions. ERS incorporates all of this into 
the framework and return results in an actionable value versus cost analysis to enable affordability 
analysis. ERS can additionally be modeled with natural hazards or intelligent adversaries. All of 
these features of ERS allow significant flexibility in the types of systems and availability of 
probabilistic estimates to quantify value. In this paper, a case study was used to explore the ability 
of the ERS framework to adapt and produce results with optimization. ERS includes a value model 
or multiple objective decisions. This flexibility allows the ERS framework to be applied to many 
areas in addition to network models such as supply-chains, weapon systems, and other multi-
functional systems. The ERS framework as described in this paper is a useful (Railroads) approach 
for the purposes of engineering resilient systems. 
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6. Further Research 
In future work relative to the case study however, multiple values could be used to provide 
context for the value of the system. Perhaps it is more valuable for Poplar Bluff to have 
production than Jefferson City and that texture to the problem was lost in this cost analysis. ERS 
provides the foundation for value to be measured and an excellent future use of this case study 
would be the calculation of the non-cost value of each option plotted with respect to the 
calculated cost done in this study to determine the affordability of each project. 
One area for further research with ERS is the function of time in the model. The value of the design 
decisions between a network which fully recovers in 2 years is vastly different to the decisions 
which allow the network to fully recover in 2 weeks. This significance has the potential to be lost 
given the current framework as special care must be given to associate the value over time. Should 
an indefinite point of time t be chosen in the framework the value associated with a quick recovery 
would be lost. Thus one area of further research would be to establish methods for evaluating value 
over time for the various applications of the ERS framework. 
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